Before we go into the topic, there are five concepts we need to look at first: possible worlds, modal possibility vs factual possibility, actus purus, accidental creation and divine simplicity.
Possible Worlds:
Gottfried W. Leibniz held that God, having always sufficient reason for what He does and being omniscient and omnibenevolent, would choose to create the best possible world, out of love1. He distinguished between necessary truths (true in all possible worlds) and contingent truths (true in some possible worlds but not in others). The actual world is contingent; it exists because God freely chose it over other possible worlds, not because it was necessary. He posited that even the best possible world may contain some evil, but this evil is outweighed by the greater good that comes from the overall harmony and order of the world, or simply that evil is necessitated as potential to bring forth good at all.
Leibniz also introduced the notion of compossibility, which refers to the compatibility of individual substances or entities with one another in a single possible world. Not all possible entities can coexist; only those that are compossible can form a coherent and unified world. The actual world is the one where the maximal number of compossible entities coexist in the most harmonious (containing “good” and “moral”) way, and I would add: without making it necessary or probable that much more pain or evil exists also.
It is conceivable, for example, that two worlds are equal in terms of the good they contain and the potential for evil, and only differ in the fact that two atoms are in different places. Each possible world is thought of as a complete concept or set of propositions that describes every detail about how things could have been, with its own unique history and set of events. It is not just the starting point in a timeline. What makes a world possible, given it would need to coexist with God? For one, it just containing ideas or things that are not contradictory with themselves or each other in the given order. Secondly, their harmony with God’s nature. In fact, only because of harmony with God’s nature a logical world is said to be necessitated. Everything else will be discussed further.
Modal Possibility vs factual possibility:
Modal Possibility describes logically possible things, often in an abstract understanding and in a relation to logically necessary things. However, some argue that only that which actually exists is possible. Factual possibility pertains to what is possible within the actual world, given the current state of affairs and the actual laws governing it. It is more restrictive and grounded in the reality we experience. Indeed, beyond hypothetical scenarios, it only makes sense to speak of a modal possibility that does not harmonize with factual possibility if one does not think the world is an absolutely deterministic2 machine and that there was a point of randomness. If this is the only [methaphyscily] possible world, it would be another brute fact, a factual necessity because it came to be.
Were one to consider a metaphysics that allows for the possibility that God created [one] world from multiple options, not all of which were actualized, and if all these options were indeed possible and not determined looking at God's intrinsic vectors of nature and will to a single output [without randomness], then modal possibility is a reality. Today, I begin to propose a model for this.
Another thing in this regards. “Creation is nothing other than the granting of hypostasis to the fullness of the Logos's content. The whole divine-world is actualized in as many possible (and thus infinite) ways that it can be.”
Contra: We cannot pick out by our reasoning without additional material whether one creation is the best or infinite many are the best, for both singularity and infinity share an attractiveness intuitively speaking. The reason one may say only one is actualized would be because of divine revelation, not that one says infinite many actualized worlds are impossible, just that it is not the prime notion of the Church Fathers3.
Actus Purus:
In created reality, we observe what can be described as a [fundamental] transition from potentiality to actuality, from things that can be the case into actually being the case. This transition necessitates action; just as a carpenter's work transforms wood that has the potential to become many things into an actual—let's say—table. Some “initiation” or “action” is needed. According to the philosophy of the great Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas, this initiation—an original, primal act(tion)—was essential at the inception of existence, beginning the actualization of all subsequent entities. This concept mirrors the Unmoved Mover argument, which posits the necessity of a prime mover to set things into motion.
However, here I don't use it as an argument for the existence of God but for the essence of God, for how God must be, at least in relation to how we can know God to be, something I refer to as “God energetically”4. The second rationale revolves around the infinity of God. Aquinas proposes that God encompasses within Himself the entirety of perfection inherent in all existence. There exists no aspect of perfection that God lacks, nor any space that He does not occupy. In essence, God is self-contained and omnipresent, according to Aquinas. Of course, “perfection” is taken as the highest or absolute realization on a scale, which means that what is on the other side of the scale is contra-perfection and not something that also needs to be perfected. Evil is the contra to good, and not something that contributes to perfection.
The Orthodox Fathers also held to actus purus, as we discussed, the only thing one might add to the Western understanding is that there is something beyond being when speaking of God, which we call His essence, while Catholics might be drawn to call the essence the perfection of every principle of or in being5. Either way, God is actus purus in every way we are able to speak of Him or name Him.
Accidental creation:
Definitions:
Essential: That which one must have in order to be oneself.
Accidental: That which one has or that is part of oneself, but without which one would still be oneself.
Thus, “accidental creation” is all of that which could have been different in creation, without negating the possibility of creation by going against what is essential to it.
I) Our creation correlates with God’s decision. Would be one atom differently, God’s decision would have been one to create this atom differently.
II) If our creation could have been different, then God’s decision about it could have been different.
III) Let’s suppose our creation could have been different.
IV) Ergo, God’s decision could have been different.
V) Thus even though God would have been the same in every (other) way, in this one variable, His decision, He would be different.
VI) Thus, even considered this decision is not part or aspect of God’s identity, God could have been differently in a way not concering His identity, thus He has an accident.
VII) God has no accidents (dogma), and does not change essentially (dogma).
Conclusion: Therefore, God could not have created another world.
Introduction:
It may appear difficult to create harmony in this matter; between possible worlds and God as actus purus. The reconciliation lies, as is often said, in understanding that God’s act of actualizing one possible world is a manifestation of His eternal, unchanging will. Since God is eternal, His act of creation does not imply a sequence of potentialities being realized. Instead, it is the expression of His perfect and immutable nature. God's choice to actualize a particular world is not a process of change but an eternal act consistent with His nature as actus purus. This perspective preserves both the immutability of God and His freedom to create, grounded in His eternal wisdom and goodness.
This also has to do with understanding the difference between passive and active potency: Actus Purus traditionally negates merely “passive potency”.6 Active potency refers to the inherent ability or capacity of an entity to bring about change or to act. It is the potential to perform actions or produce effects. Passive potency refers to the inherent ability or capacity of an entity to undergo change or to be acted upon. It is the potential to receive actions or effects from external sources.
Implication of Change (Preimise V): Here is the critical point. In classical theism, God’s will (decisions) can manifest in various ways (different possible worlds) without implying a change in His essence. The will of God is considered an expression of His unchanging nature in different contexts. But within the framework of divine simplicity, where God’s knowledge and will are not separate from His essence, a new problem would arise.
How can God's will not be separate from His essence, while it is true to say that it could have manifested in a different way?
Divine Simplicity:
What is meant by simplicity in this context? It refers to the indivisibility of a thing. For instance, many philosophers describe the mind as simple: one cannot possess half a mind; it is either present in its entirety or absent. Entities that exist in this undivided manner are termed simple. In contrast, one can have half an arm, indicating that arms are divisible and not simple. God is simple in the sense that everything inherent in God is wholly present in every single thing in or (ontologically) of God. The type of simplicity that would conflict with Orthodox teachings is the kind that interprets distinctions as implying divisibility.
To briefly summarize the reasons why we believe in Divine Simplicity. Of course, one could go into more depth on all points.
God is infinitely perfect and beyond limitations. Any composition within God would imply imperfection, which is incompatible with the concept of an absolutely perfect being.
Simplicity ensures God's unchanging nature and timelessness. If God were composed of parts or truly distinct attributes, instead of each attribute being in reality another of one (simple) substance, being or essence, there would be a potential for change or alteration within God Himself. However, since God is considered to be immutable and timeless, simplicity ensures His unchanging nature. Divine simplicity underscores God's absolute unity and indivisibility. He is absolute singularity.
God's creative power stems directly from His unified nature, not from external factors. Divine Simplicity also avoids so called “anthropomorphic conceptions”7 of God. Also, His simplicity is foundational in mystical experiences, revealing the absolute unity of God beyond concepts.
The doctrine of divine simplicity can be understood as a negation of any real [ontological] distinction between God's substance and His attributes. Life and love refer to the same entity, as Trey noted, to God, He is life and He is love8 in a literal sense and that opens the path to interesting conclusions considering the relationship between eternal life, time and love.
The Word-Machine:
Johnathon: In my mind it would be that God could've created a different, equally good, world, and though it is different, it would still be an expression of His same eternal attributes. I'm gonna appeal to Bradshaw's analogy. A husband always loves his wife with the same love, but one day he buys her flowers and one day chocolates. Has his first actuality (love) changed? It has just been manifested in two different ways. The decision is itself the expression of His nature. Would I need to specify on what line of reasoning I build my answer, then I would say that it seems like the way you've characterized the possibility of God making different decisions (in premise V), you've tied the difference of decision to a difference in His being, but I would ask why you think that connection is there. Depending on how you're using “being” there, I think my answer would be different.
Justus: To summarize my position regarding the potential worlds in God and negation of each potency, I see things like this:
Definition: A decision is an idea endowed with the will for actualisation.
i) God has infinite many ideas for creation9, multiple of which—maybe even infinite many also—are possible. It is dogma, as I understand it, that God could've not created us, thus His will could have been on another decision.
ii) His will for actualization is only on one, at least not on all ideas.
iii) Will and ideas are aspects of God as absolute simple.
iv) The connection of will to a specific idea is at least in God’s being.
Conclusion: Thus, at least something in God’s being could have been different. (i-iv)
If we speak of the gifts of a husband towards his wife, while the first actuality of love is always actualised, whereas the secondary actuality—the specific expression of this love—is not always actualised. In the case of God, however, if He were pure actualization, He would do all options of actualisation if all were possibilities to Him. Yet, we say that He actualizes only one course of action regarding creation. So there would be an unactualised possibility or accident, we might think at first. Secondary actuality refers to the form or mode in which first actuality is expressed.
A specific gift is a form of love, a mode of expression. But it is exactly these expressions that must all exist simultaneously in God to be not mere potential, unless they are expressed in something other than God Himself. Thus, when we have a first actuality like love and its mode of expression as second actuality, this can only remain mere potentiality—not actualized—if it is not intrinsic to God. This means: To provide any unspecified option for creation endowed with the will of actualization at all is first actuality. The specific option for creation that is endowed with the will of actualization out of this necessity, on the other hand, is second actuality. Or rather, this specific act is second actuality.
If the endowment of the specific option for creation with the will of actualization is intrinsic to God and not an outgoing act, God must either possess passivity (1), accidents (2), or have created every possible world (3), while also having chosen the option not to create. If something within or of God can be different, it seems to fall under the category of what it means to be not necessary. Something within or of God that is not necessary appears to be accidental.
If God has an accident, He is not actus purus.
But if the endowment of the specific option for creation with the will of actualization is not intrinsic to God, we avoid these three fatal possibilities. Through the course of our conversation, I conceived of just one way to solve this conundrum.
Creation is by ex nihilo10 (dogma).
Ex nihilo is by power of the Word.
If something unspecified is input into the Word, a random possible specification is given as output. This function I dub “Word-machine.”
Creation is specified to be compatible with God's nature, resulting either in A: it non-happening or B: one of the best possible worlds existing. Perhaps C: either all possible worlds exist, or just one or zero, for zero, one and infinity express God’s perfection as notions of quantity most: apophatically, simple or infinite. If we see that one world, no world, and infinitely many worlds would equally express God's perfection by representing another aspect of Him, we can conclude that, through the spontaneous assumption of existence, one of these options manifested. Which one we would know only through divine revelation in His Church.
The specification is determined by the function of the Word-machine.
Thus, the specification of the created world is itself part of the outgoing act of creation, which is first actuality. This Word-machine is eternal. God inputs a formula, and a random actualization occurs from the possible options. There exists a smaller infinity of possible options for creation, including non-creation. All options are without unnecessary suffering etc. and fully compatible with God. One random option is actualised by the power of the Word. This Word-machine is by first actualisation itself, as is the input, but the output is the second actualisation and the first act of creation. It may be that there are two inputs, one for the question of creation at all, and one for the specification if it should occur. Both connect if possible, thus if the first output is “existence” rather than “not existence”, then it would connect to “essence”, which is the second output.
Johnathon: I'm not sure I'd characterize it as random, but completely free. I do think there's a distinction there.
Justus: If there were a difference between those two, it would, to my comprehension, appear inscrutable. Perhaps there is, but “coincidence” should be considered an apt provisional term. And not “completely” random, but rather random amongst the best possible alternatives. We both would concur, I suppose, by saying that God's intrinsic nature is pure actuality, yet His free will allows Him to select among various [modal] possibilities in how He interacts with creation.
Therefore, I assert that God's will to select a singular option for creation—including the option to create nothing—is of necessity. The constraint of this will to the set of the best possible worlds is likewise necessary.
Consequently, all within God is of necessity, pure actual. The specific option that will be actualised is output of the commandline to create ex-nihilo, originating not from God but from creation itself. Thus, the accidental element pertains to creation, not to God.
Moreover, there arises the question of how a single idea, and no other, could be endowed with the will for actualization within God, if God is truly simple and thus each conceivable idea is perpetually endowed with the will for actualization, given that there exists no divisibility between idea and will. That is, without the Word-machine. Also, the division between one infinity and another, best worlds and lesser worlds, making the first possible and the later impossible, may have been by the Word-machine too: for it can just actualize what is compatible with God. In this situation, God's decision, an idea endowed with the will for actualization, would just be to actualize at all an idea regarding outside of Him, and even if that idea is just to not create. To make a decision in regards to the outside, the not-God, is required for God’s completeness. However, this actualization would have to be intrinsically compatible with God, thereby rendering all worlds incongruent with His nature into impossible ones.
Lastly, I propose that the chosen idea of creation inherently encompasses the timing of actualization. That I was actualized subsequent to my father, and my father subsequent to my grandfather, constitutes an integral part of the idea of creation.
Johnathon: I appreciate you summarizing the trajectory of your thought. I think we can view the possible worlds as the result of God's perfect understanding of His own creative ability, but His ability must be harmonized with His infinitely free will. I think we would want to affirm both of those, and it seems like free acts of creation involve a movement of God outside of Himself, and nothing outside of God is necessary at all. So it seems a bit off to me to think of unactualized possible acts of creation as implying genuine potential in God's being, strictly speaking, as His infinite knowledge of His own creative ability and what He could do don't constitute any kind of imperfection. It might be somewhat analogous to the fact that God's decision to create people with a free will didn't somehow take away from His perfectly free will. Not sure how much of what I just said squares with your view, but it's what came to mind when I read it.
Justus: I agree that one can see the possibile worlds as logically necessitated by (or result of) Him knowing Himself, and that the line is to bring about a dual reality: on one side God, the only and wholly necessary—wwherein necessity encompasses both existence (that He exists) and essence (the manner in which He exists); on the other side, creation, which is not wholly necessary. Indeed, unactualized possible acts do not signify genuine potential within God's being, for all that is necessary is contained within God, and all that is not necessary is an effect or manifestation thereof.
There being infinite or myriad possible worlds is necessary and thus inherent in God. However, any given combination—an individual possible world i on one hand and the endowment with the will of actualization w on the other—is not necessary. Thus, such a combination cannot reside within or be of God, except as an effect or manifestation. Therefore, I assert that the only necessary act of God is the choice to actualize any i, with the option not to create being considered as an i as well. Consequently, the specific i that is actualized is an effect, not intrinsic to God.
Johnathon: I think I agree with almost everything here, but I'm inclined to press back a bit on the conceptualization of His choice not to create as an act of the will in the same sense as His choice to create. Maybe this is just a cognitive hangup on my part, but it doesn't intuitively seem that not choosing to create would be an activity, strictly speaking, whereas the choice to create would be. But I'm also willing to be completely wrong about that. I'm just trying to conceptualize it. Perhaps His choice not to create would involve an intra-Trinitarian activity, but not involve any movement outside of Himself.
Justus: Well, God either chooses to do something in regards to not-God, creation, or He chooses to not do so, right? He wouldn't be undecided. Thus it is a decision. “No create” is an idea that is “willed” by Him, I called it “embowed with a will of actualisation.” Well, even an empty set contains one element noting it’s emptiness.
“[Perhaps] His choice not to create would involve an intra-Trinitarian activity, but not involve any movement outside of Himself” I’d say is false. It would be a will reaching the outside.
Johnathon: This is true, and yes I think it makes sense that one decision would lead to a movement outside of Himself, and the other not. But what outside, if it's not actualized? The idea of the outside maybe. It reminds me of the logical distinction between -C(X) and C(-X), where C is a creation function, and X is the possible world. But still the word 'produce' is strange in this context. Even if you define creation as the resonance between an idea in God's mind and a corresponding operation of God or energy, as you once said, non-resonance is kind of just the default state of things pre-creation and so wouldn't need to be produced, per se. I guess what I'm getting at would be something like a privation view of non-creation -- it being the privation of creation, rather than a positive reality in itself.
Justus: Your analogy is indeed a good one. I think C(-X) must be the reality and -(X) I see no way to be possible. In my estimation, it seems necessary that God, at the very least, actualizes nothingness—that is, the knowledge of the absence of existence outside of Him He decided for. Thus, I propose that the standard here is neither resonance nor non-resonance. That is why God’s decision is necessary, because it could be both. I believe this resolves the matter, positing that pre-creation exists in a state intermediate between creation and non-creation, and it is the divine decision that resolves this equilibrium. One might even characterize this as the transition from chaos to order. Metaphyical quantum state pre-creation so to speak.
Johnathon: You're conceiving “pre-creation” as having the logical structure of quantum superposition almost it seems. Well that's pretty awesome, and I would see it as a win that your position necessitated that.
This line of thought was continued in There are many possible worlds, part 2. There we have developed a possible answer to the question “How can God have specific knowledge about His creation without it implying any change within Him, and how can He know guilt, truly, if He is not guilty?”, among others.
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~ Justus.
Willing the good of the other in relation to the measure of love: the best of the other if loved without conditions. Wishing them well, deeply.
Hard determination, predestination [including God’s absolute providence] or fatalism.
“Now, as an Orthodox Christian, but even before that in my ecumenist efforts, I hold that for that very reason one ought to have definite or good reason to reject what most of the Fathers said. Although the Fathers may err on certain matters—especially in instances of doctrinal discordance where the Church has yet to reconcile differences—when it concerns matters of the unseen realm, where the faculties of the mind can only venture hypotheses, it appears prudent to cover the most ground of those people that were most close to God, as it seems, the Saints, provided no new data need be introduced to do so. This, it seems, is the essence of spiritual insight—to safeguard against error. It would be folly, it seems to me, to entrust this endeavor solely to the operations of one's own mind or even heart, when the venerable men and women of holiness stand ready to guide, given She—the Church—is believed to have the justifications to be a spiritual authority.” - Mystery and Reason
Energy, here, means movement or action.
“Being as pure act” rather than “common being”.
ABC of Scholastic Philosophy, Page 329-330.
The attribution of human traits, emotions, or intentions to non-human entities.
The biological factors are thus just reflecting or carrying a deeper reality, something that goes beyond them. Love is not the mixture of chemicals, or the electrical signals in the brain; the correlating phenomenon is caused through our participation in Christ God.
Every imaginable world.
Out of no prior substance.